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- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06

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[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
     [packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
     implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
     timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
     some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
     readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
This commit is contained in:
Damien Miller
2010-07-16 13:57:51 +10:00
parent d0244d498b
commit 8a0268f1b3
10 changed files with 45 additions and 23 deletions
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7
ssh-rsa.c
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.41 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.42 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int, RSA *);
@@ -249,11 +250,11 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen);
goto done;
}
if (memcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) != 0) {
if (timing_safe_cmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) != 0) {
error("oid mismatch");
goto done;
}
if (memcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) != 0) {
if (timing_safe_cmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) != 0) {
error("hash mismatch");
goto done;
}